How Biowarfare Started
A story of catapulting bodies, leprosy wine, and deadly blankets.
The world has changed since the beginning of 2020. In a short time, lively cities became silent, news stopped reporting whooping all-time-highs of stock indexes, airlines stopped flying, and home office became the only office for a while.
Besides halting the world, the virus also demonstrated how vulnerable society can be against a biological threat¹. The latter can emerge naturally or is spread deliberately as an act of war or terrorism. Biological warfare is associated with a similar dread as is the use of nuclear weaponry. The palpable presence of death, the invisibility of the “agent” and helplessness surround both. It is thus not surprising that both are often mentioned in the context of terrorism, whose impact spurs from the fear and horror it instills. Additionally, nuclear and biological warfare are often simultaneously deemed as an anomaly of modern science: using breakthrough discoveries for causing harm. Yet, contrary to nuclear, biological warfare far precedes its scientific understanding. Well before the anthrax attacks in 2001, and even before science-based germ theory outdid miasma (“bad air”) theory of disease, biological agents were deployed to advance strategic position in the war.
Before a lab coat, there was a toga
Back in sixth century BC as the Greek philosophy was gaining traction, the First Sacred War broke out between Amphictyonic League of Delphi and the city of Kirrha. During the siege, a water pipe was found. Here, the details get a bit sketchy, but in a nutshell, besiegers added hellebore to the water supply². Hellebore is a toxic plant; Greeks used it in small quantities to “treat” paralysis and insanity — in higher quantities, it causes vomiting, abdominal cramping, and diarrhea. As Kirrhans started drinking the poisoned water, widespread diarrhea started, weakening the city defenses, and finally leading to the fall of Kirrha. Here, tainting of water supply can be considered chemical warfare — yet many biological weapons’ primary mode of action is through poisons made by the weaponized organism. The tradition of tainting the enemy’s water supplies continued: while conquering Italy in the 12th century, emperor Barbarossa has poisoned water wells with decomposing bodies.
The pestilence begins
The entry of bubonic plague into Europe from Asia is unclear. However, the siege of Kaffa in 1346 is associated with a notorious deed: attacking Mongolians catapulted into the Genoese fortress their soldiers, who died of bubonic plague. One can only fathom a horror as the infectious cadavers flew into the besieged city. The city was abandoned and soon after the grim era of Black Death settled on Europe and Asia. While Mongols had no microbiological understanding of the disease, they weaponized the observation that the vicinity to the sick or deceased leads to the disease — an essential step towards weaponizing knowledge.
Be suspicious of wine left behind
A particularly malicious act of biowarfare happened in Italy during a Naples Campaign in 1495. As retreating Spanish gave a village to victorious French, they left behind caskets of wine. French did not know that the blood of syphilis and leprosy patients was added to the wine. The folklore of spiking tempting goods with poisons has a long history: a particular example is attributed to Julius Caesar². As he got captured by the Cilician pirates on his way to Bithynia, he messaged the Milesians who agreed to pay the ransom. They added copious amounts of poisonous mandrake to the wine and delivered it together with the ransom money. As pirates rejoiced the lucrative kidnapping, they soon collapsed and got slaughtered by the Milesians who returned later, recovering all the money and leaving with Caesar.
The blankets of death
Diseases are often most devastating when encountered for the first time: the disease propagates fastest as there are no immune individuals and the social habits that limit the spread are unknown or not implemented yet. When Europeans arrived in the Americas, they brought with them more than just a different culture. Diseases that had not been present in the Americas suddenly emerged, such as bubonic plague, smallpox, flu, and many more. This potency of newly encountered disease was used in the war against native Indians by the French and British alike. British handed out blankets and other items from the infirmary that were drenched in smallpox³. This presumably led to the spread of the disease to nearby tribes, accelerating the epidemics and weakening of the Indian’s position. This was even an “approved” military strategy in the book by British major Robert Donkin¹.
In some of the noted cases, it is challenging to establish causality between the wartime acts and the outcome³. As Dr. Frischknecht points out in “The History of Biological Warfare,” it is not clear how much did the besiege of Kaffa attribute to the spread of bubonic plague or what was the contribution of deliberate handing-out of clothing from smallpox patients on the emergence of the epidemic.
Biowarfare goes scientific
Systematic observations of the spread of cholera in London’s Soho district by John Snow are one of the crucial studies that overthrew the “miasma” theory and paved the road for the germ theory of disease. Systematic investigation of Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch cemented the germ theory and it offered recommendations that shaped the medical practice and influenced public health policies⁴. Yet, the basic understanding of the diseases caused by microorganisms also allowed the systematic isolation and cultivation of infectious agents.
A handful of bio-attacks occurred during World War I in which Germans used anthrax and glanders to decimate the horses of the opposing armies. Laboratory development of bioweapons has started before and continued well into the Second World War; most ill-famed was Japanese Unit 731 in Northeast China³. Under the governance of Shirō Ishii, notorious war crimes took place during experimentation with biological weapons on civilians. The unit has weaponized plague, typhus, cholera, anthrax, and others; some of the developed weapons were tested on Chinese cities, and killing thousands in the process. After the conclusion of the open conflicts of the Second World War, the shadowy Cold War began. The dread of weaponized infectious diseases grew more prominent by ever-increasing secrecy of a multitude of research facilities on either side of the Curtain.
Poisoned salads and letters of terror
Terrorism has gained momentum in the second half of the 20th century and it has become of the most discussed issues of today. While it is difficult to imagine a terrorist organization to manufacture a nuclear bomb, biological warfare is especially problematic due to the comparably simple production process of the infectious agents. Fortunately, only two instances of bioterrorism stand out:
- Rajneeshee movement poisoned salad bars in Dalles (Oregon) with Salmonella in 1984, betting that a sufficient portion of the voting population will get ill and in turn alter the result of coming elections. Over seven-hundred people got ill, but the attack passed without casualties.
- Anthrax attacks in 2001, which closely followed the terrorist attack on September 11. In the attack, multiple letters containing anthrax spores reached senators and media houses. While the culprits behind the attack were never found, the strongest suspect was a scientist from biodefense laboratories at Fort Detrick⁴. On multiple occasions letters containing white powder were mailed to prominent individuals, sparking fear and illustrating the symbolism of bioterrorism.
When did the future switch from being a promise to being a threat?
This thought from Invisible Monsters (C. Palahniuk) brings us back: is biowarfare an inevitable consequence of scientific study? Scientific understanding of infectious diseases is a remarkable achievement, which continuously saves lives. A multitude of diseases that were otherwise considered fatal are nowadays treatable, some are even considered as eradicated. Advances in bioengineering allow us to deepen our understanding of infectious agents, and engineer microbes to produce chemicals to battle infectious diseases.
While science successfully outcompeted diseases for some time, this might have lured one to believe that science can nearly instantaneously solve any emerging outbreak. Laboratories of the highest biosafety level dealing with highly infectious agents to which no treatment or vaccine is available, caution against such attitude. As an atomic power plant counterbalances nuclear weapons, modern medicine and scientific understanding of diseases counter rational design of biological weaponry that was possible due to a better understanding of the infectious diseases.
Contemplating the misuse of science in the form of biowarfare, one might lean towards curbing down the research in genetics, molecular biology, and related fields. Yet, as we see today, the basic and applied research of infectious diseases is essential. Coronavirus will not be the last infectious disease to shake the world. Further, the looming antibiotic crisis requires the intensification, rather than slowing down of research. Additionally, climate change affects the patterns in disease transmission, which can lead to further occurrences of epidemics in places where certain diseases are not common. Resorting to the wisdom of Louis Pasteur:
If it is a terrifying thought that life is at the mercy of the multiplication of the minute bodies [microbes], it is a consoling hope that science will not always remain powerless before such enemies.
While Pasteur might not have anticipated that science can create enemies rather than battle them, it is worthwhile sharing his confidence. With efficient policies and transparent scientific research, we can advance our knowledge and do good with it.
Sources
¹Barry J.M., The Great Influenza, [Penguin Books (2005)]
²Mayor A., Greek Fire, Poison Arrows, and Scorpion Bombs, [Overlook Duckworth (2009)]
³Frischknecht F., The History of Biological Warfare in Decontamination of Warfare Agents [Wiley (2008)]
⁴Khan A.S., and Patrick W., The Next Pandemic, [Public Affairs (2016)]
